This study addresses the phenomenon of misinformation about misinformation, or politicians
“crying wolf” over fake news. Strategic and false claims that stories are fake news or deepfakes may
benefit politicians by helping them maintain support after a scandal. We posit that this benefit,
known as the “liar’s dividend,” may be achieved through two politician strategies: by invoking informational
uncertainty or by encouraging oppositional rallying of core supporters. We administer five survey
experiments to over 15,000 American adults detailing hypothetical politician responses to stories describing
real politician scandals. We find that claims of misinformation representing both strategies raise
politician support across partisan subgroups. These strategies are effective against text-based reports of
scandals, but are largely ineffective against video evidence and do not reduce general trust in media.
Finally, these false claims produce greater dividends for politicians than alternative responses to scandal,
such as remaining silent or apologizing.
Von Kaylyn Jackson Schiff, Daniel S. Schiff, Natália S. Bueno im Text The Liar’s Dividend: Can Politicians Claim Misinformation to Evade Accountability? (2024)